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Laurence R. Helfer
The international intellectual property system provides an important illustration of how regime complexity shapes domestic and
international strategies of states and non-state actors. This article describes and graphically illustrates the multifaceted nature of the
international intellectual property system. It then analyzes the consequences of regime complexity for international and domestic
politics, emphasizing the strategy of regime shifting and its consequences for chessboard politics and the domestic implementation
of international rules.
T he institutions and rules of the international intel-lectual property system provide an important illus-tration of how regime complexity shapes domestic
and international politics. In particular, complexity enables
a strategy of “regime shifting” whereby states and non-
state actors relocate rulemaking processes to international
venues whose mandates and priorities favor their concerns
and interests. Forum shopping, described in several other
contributions to this symposium, also involves a change
of venues. But the goal is usually a single favorable deci-
sion. Regime shifting, by contrast, is an iterative, longer-
term strategy that seeks to create outcomes that have
feedback effects in other venues. Regime shifting works by
broadening the policy spaces within which relevant deci-
sions are made and rules are adopted, thereby expanding
the constellation of interests and issues that actors must
consider when defining rules, norms, and decision-making
procedures.
The Origins of Complexity in
the International Intellectual
Property System
The international intellectual property system is com-
posed of a dense thicket of linkages and relationships among
treaties, international organizations, and multilateral,
regional and bilateral negotiating venues. Deeply nested
multilateral treaties comprise some parts of this system,
the most famous being the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). TRIPs is
a member of the family of World Trade Organization
(WTO) treaties and itself incorporates an earlier group of
multilateral treaties (including the Berne Convention, the
Paris Convention, and the Rome Convention) protecting
patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other intellectual prop-
erty rights. Rules relating to intellectual property also exist
in other international institutions, such as the Conference
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), the World Health Organization (WHO), the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Parallel
treaties and institutions predominate in other areas, such
as the intersection of human rights and intellectual prop-
erty, a topic that has been actively studied from different
perspectives within the United Nations human rights sys-
tem as well as the WTO and WIPO.1
The international intellectual property system was not
always so densely populated. As recently as the early 1990s,
the treaties and international organizations concerned with
intellectual property occupied a highly specialized and tech-
nocratic corner of international law with few connections
to other issue areas. That relative isolation ended in 1994
when the United States and the European Communities,
pressured by their respective intellectual property indus-
tries, shifted negotiations over intellectual property from
the WIPO to the WTO and linked the result of those
negotiations (the TRIPs Agreement) to the new WTO
dispute settlement system. Any nation seeking to join the
international trade club was required to accept a package
deal that included both strong intellectual property rights
and robust international enforcement of those rights.2
That TRIPs dramatically expanded intellectual prop-
erty protection standards is well known to legal scholars
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and political scientists.3 What is less understood is how
TRIPs created tension points in other issue areas—such as
human rights, public health, biodiversity, and plant genetic
resources—that acted as catalysts for new intellectual prop-
erty rules in nested, parallel, and overlapping inter-
national institutions. These tension points had both
substantive and procedural dimensions.4
Substantively, TRIPs required states to grant intellec-
tual property rights in fields—such as genetic resources,
pharmaceuticals, and plant varieties—that developing
countries believed should not be treated as private prop-
erty on moral or cultural grounds. The conflicts between
TRIPs and this competing regulatory approach weakened
the clarity of existing legal rules and created uncertainty
for states over how to reconcile the resulting conflicts.
Procedurally, tensions were created by TRIPs’ more strin-
gent enforcement mechanisms as compared to the weaker
enforcement structures that exist in international regimes
outside of the WTO. As a treaty nested within the WTO,
compliance with TRIPs is achieved through the WTO
dispute settlement system, a system in which ac hoc pan-
els and the WTO Appellate Body issue rulings that inter-
pret IP protection rules and in which states that fail to
comply with these rulings risk retaliatory trade sanctions.
The strength of the WTO dispute settlement system cre-
ated a structural imbalance whereby the stronger pressures
to adhere to TRIPs undermined states’ ability to comply
with the rules of other regimes where those rules inter-
sected with TRIPs.
The Consequences of Complexity
in the International Intellectual
Property System
TRIPs’ expansion of intellectual property protection rules
and enforcement mechanisms engendered resistance from
developing countries and civil society groups. Although
developing countries had accepted TRIPs as the price of
admission to the WTO, many had done so without giving
adequate consideration to the treaty’s costs or its domestic
political consequences. Civil society groups feared that
TRIPs would undermine the rules and objectives of the
human rights, public health, biodiversity, and plant genetic
resources regimes in which they carried out their advocacy
work.5
In the decade following the adoption of TRIPs, both
sets of actors worked to limit the adverse effects of the
treaty and to roll back its more onerous provisions. In
response to these efforts, industrialized countries (most
notably the United States and the European Communi-
ties) and their intellectual property industries attempted
to shore up support for TRIPs and to extend its provisions
by adding them to regional and bilateral trade and invest-
ment treaties. These competing efforts to undermine and
extend TRIPs where characterized by at least three of the
five mechanisms described by Alter and Meunier in their
introductory article.6
First, state and nonstate actors adopted a strategy of
“regime shifting.” As I will explain, regime shifting enabled
both powerful and weaker states and their allies to relo-
cate rulemaking initiatives to international venues con-
cerned with other issue areas—such as foreign investment,
human rights, public health, and biodiversity. These regimes
were more closely aligned with the shifters’ interests because
of their distinctive institutional mandates, differing mem-
berships, or greater permeability to non-state actors.
Second, the expansion of the intellectual property sys-
tem privileged certain strategies, arguments, and outcomes
while disfavoring others—a quintessential illustration of
chessboard politics.These politics are masked if one takes a
static snapshot of the system at a single moment. Observers
must instead adopt a dynamic perspective that considers
the development of the system over time, including the inter-
active effects of simultaneous and sequential negotiations
in multiple venues. Examining how intellectual property
rules developed across international institutions reveals a
principal objective of regime shifting—the creation of legal
rules in one forum as an intermediate strategy for later incor-
porating those rules into other institutions and treaties. By
adopting this multi-step strategy, actors can increase their
bargaining position relative to the power they could have
exercised were treaty-making confined to a single inter-
national venue.
Third and finally, complexity both shapes and con-
strains implementation politics, in particular how states
incorporate international intellectual property rules into
national legal systems. In some instances, complexity pro-
vides states with “cover” to implement their preferred inter-
pretation of ambiguous treaty obligations. In others, it
enables powerful countries to outflank weaker states by
creating rules in one venue that eliminate or dramatically
Figure 1
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constrain the discretion those countries had previously
negotiated in a different venue.
In the sections that follow, I elaborate on each of these
three mechanisms.
Regime Shifting by Powerful and Weaker States
In the years immediately following the adoption of the
TRIPs Agreement, industrialized countries whose domes-
tic industries benefitted from strong intellectual property
rights sought to build on TRIPs by further expanding
those rights. They initially turned to WTO and WIPO,
organizations these states believed would be hospitable
venues in which to negotiate new multilateral agreements.
These efforts made some limited progress, but were quickly
sidelined by more pressing problems, such as the failed
attempt to launch a new round of trade talks in Seattle in
1999. Part of the backlash against the WTO was triggered
by a growing resistance from developing countries and
civil society groups to the moral, political, and economic
legitimacy of TRIPs and the high costs of complying with
the treaty.7
With negotiations in the WTO effectively stalled, both
proponents and opponents of stronger intellectual prop-
erty rules groups of states sought out greener pastures in
other international regimes.Developingcountriesdecamped
to the WHO, FAO, and CBD. These organizations and
negotiating venues offered these states advantages that they
did not possess in the WTO and in WIPO. First, the goals
of these institutions—topromotepublichealth,plantgenetic
sources, and biodiversity—predisposed them to view chal-
lenges to expansive intellectual property rights sympathet-
ically. Second, industrialized nations were either absent from
these venues (the United States has never ratified the CBD,
for example) or were represented by government ministries
whose negotiating objectives were more sympathetic to
developing country concerns.Third and finally, the WHO,
FAO, and CBD, unlike the WTO, were relatively open to
civil society, including NGOs that were highly critical of
TRIPs and that worked with developing states to fashion
strategies for challenging the treaty.8
The United States and the European Communities, by
contrast, shifted their efforts from the WTO and WIPO
to bilateral and regional trade and investment treaties,
incorporating IP protection rules into these agreements.
Industrialized states could more easily leverage their eco-
nomic and political clout in these intimate negotiating
forums. In exchange for enhanced access to their markets,
these states demanded that developing countries ratify the
new WIPO treaties or adhere to intellectual property pro-
tection standards that exceeded those found in TRIPs.
Opponents derisively labeled these bilateral and regional
agreements as “TRIPs plus” treaties.9
The contemporaneous negotiation of competing intel-
lectual property standards in different multilateral, regional,
and bilateral venues created dense “policy spaces” in which
legal rules intersected in complex and contradictory ways.10
For developing countries, the different goals, member-
ships, and NGO permeability of the WHO, FAO, and
CBD provided opportunities to generate “counterregime
norms”—treaties and nonbinding recommendations that
challenged TRIPs.11 But even as counterregime norms were
being created in these multilateral venues, they were under-
mined by the simultaneous negotiation of more stringent
intellectual property rules in bilateral and regional “TRIPs
plus” treaties.
Regime shifting also produced more convoluted and con-
flicting legal rules than would have been generated by a sin-
gle international organization in which the same actors
operated under a common subject-matter mandate. Not sur-
prisingly, post-TRIPs scholarship analyzing the international
intellectual property system has devoted considerable atten-
tion to reconciling the conflicting legal obligations.12
As this discussion illustrates, regime shifting in the inter-
national intellectual property system enabled both pow-
erful and weaker states to develop legal rules that more
accurately reflected their respective interests and con-
cerns. As explained below, the goal of this strategy was not
simply to create conflicting rules. Rather, regime shifting
enabled these competing groups of countries to create new
approaches that expanded the constellation of interests
and issues that actors were required to consider when defin-
ing rules, norms, and decision-making procedures. The
result was a substantial restructuring of the international
intellectual property protection system.
Chessboard Politics and the Consequences of Shifting
Negotiating to Multiple International Venues
A recognition that intellectual property protection stan-
dards are fashioned in multiple international regimes does
not explain how states benefited from this disaggregated
rulemaking venues. In fact, the inconsistent legal rules
generated by regime shifting may initially appear detri-
mental to states’ interests. As Alter and Meunier argue,
however, chessboard politics cannot be discerned by exam-
ining a single historical moment. Rather, the strategies of
actors and their consequences emerge over time as a result
of the interactive effects of negotiating in multiple venues.
Analyzing international regimes using this evolutionary
perspective reveals the strategic advantages that complex-
ity created for certain actors, in particular for less power-
ful states.
Recall that developing countries and civil society groups
opposed to strong intellectual property rights shifted to
other international regimes to create counterregime norms
that conflicted with TRIPs and “TRIPs plus” agreements.
To mount an effective challenge to these treaties, however,
developing countries needed to do more than simply cre-
ate counterregime norms. They needed to integrate those
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norms into the WTO and its powerful dispute settlement
system.
Developing countries could, of course, have proposed
revisions to TRIPs without first crafting their proposals in
other international venues. Yet their past experience in
negotiating in the WTO against more powerful industri-
alized states made them wary of doing so. In particular,
during the Uruguay Round of trade talks leading to the
adoption of TRIPs, the United States, European Commu-
nities, Japan, and Canada had formed a negotiating “quad”
that excluded developing countries from key agenda set-
ting and drafting sessions. As a result of this strategy, devel-
oping countries had little choice but to accept the final
package deal that the quad presented to them.13
The existence of international regimes in which devel-
oping countries had greater influence changed the inter-
national negotiating dynamic and strengthened their
bargaining position in the WTO in two distinct ways.
First, the existence of parallel and overlapping venues for
intellectual property rulemaking enabled like-minded states
to coordinate their challenges to TRIPs around reform
proposals that had first been tested and refined in more
sympathetic venues such as the CBD, FAO, and WHO.
When developing states later introduced these proposals
into the WTO (in the second phase of their regime shift-
ing strategy), they followed this previously-agreed-to script
for reform. By negotiating as a group to achieve a predeter-
mined outcome, these states created a counterweight to
the industrialized country quad.14
Second, the existence of parallel and overlapping insti-
tutions enabled developing countries to adopt rules in one
forum (the CBD, for example) that were in tension with
rules previously approved in another venue (such as the
WTO). As discussed earlier, these rules decreased the clar-
ity of international law. But they also created “strategic
inconsistencies” that developing country officials used to
bolster their arguments for revising TRIPs.15 In particular,
these officials justified their demands for reform by invok-
ing rules endorsed by states, intergovernmental bureau-
crats, and legal experts in other international venues. By
invoking these previously sanctioned rules, developing states
could plausibly claim that their reform proposals were
rational efforts to harmonize inconsistent legal rules
governing the same subject matter rather than self-serving
ploys to back away from a treaty they had previously
pledged to uphold.16
Developing countries successfully employed this multi-
step regime shifting strategy to promote the Declaration
on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, a document
adopted by the WTO membership in 2001 as part of
the launch of a new round of trade talks in Doha. The
Declaration’s proponents—a consortium of more than
fifty developing states and their NGO allies—demanded
greater access to patented medicines used to treat HIV/
AIDS and other pandemics. To support this goal, the
coalition relied on proposals to restrict pharmaceutical
patents that had previously been adopted in the WHO
and the UN human rights system. Developing countries
cited these proposals to urge the WTO membership to
address “an issue that has aroused public interest and is
being actively debated outside this organization, but one
which we cannot afford to ignore.”17 The result was a
Declaration that endorsed the coalition’s view that TRIPs
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.”18 In the years following the Declaration’s
adoption, WTO member states have amended TRIPs to
expand its compulsory license rules to benefit poor coun-
tries facing public health emergencies.19
As this discussion illustrates, international regime com-
plexity altered the politics of intellectual property. It allowed
developing countries to employ a multi-step regime shift-
ing strategy in which they first created counterregime norms
in international venues sympathetic to their interests, and
later relied on those norms to enhance their bargaining
position in the WTO. Regime complexity thus enabled
developing states to increase their power in the WTO in a
way that would have been impossible had negotiations
been confined to that organization. This mulit-step strat-
egy is only revealed, however, by a dynamic analysis that
considers how actors use different international venues of
the complex to promote their interests over time.
The Politics of Domestic Implementation of
International Rules
A third consequence of international regime complexity
relates to the incorporation of international obligations into
national legal systems.As compared toa single-venue regime,
the existence of overlapping and parallel regimes modifies
implementation politics in two distinct and opposing ways.
First, the multiplicity of legal rules generated in nested,
overlapping, and parallel institutions can make it more
difficult to claim that states have implemented those rules
in ways that violate their treaty obligations. In particular,
as the rules regulating intellectual property become more
numerous, nuanced, and contradictory, they provide greater
leeway for states to interpret and implement rules to fur-
ther their own interests while remaining nominally within
the boundaries of what international law requires.
Decision 486 of the Andean Community provides an
apt illustration. Adopted by the biodiversity-rich nations
of this South America sub-region in 2000, Decision 486
attempts to reconcile the intellectual property protection
rules of TRIPs with the biodiversity preservation measures
of the CBD. It does so by imposing various restrictions on
patents derived from biological materials found in Andean
Community member states.20 Whether these restrictions
are in fact compatible with TRIPs’ patent protection rules
| |



Symposium | International Regime Complexity
42 Perspectives on Politics
is open to debate.21 Yet no state has filed a WTO dispute
settlement complaint challenging Decision 486 as a vio-
lation of TRIPs. To the contrary, Andean Countries have
promoted the legislation as a good faith attempt to har-
monize the two multilateral treaties, albeit an attempt that
furthers their own interests in safeguarding the region’s
biological heritage.
Second, international regime complexity provides oppor-
tunities for powerful states to narrow the options available
to weaker countries to implement intellectual property
rules into their national legal systems. TRIPs expressly
contemplates that WTO member states may adopt higher
standards of intellectual property protection in other inter-
national agreements. Capitalizing on this rule, the United
States has sought to strengthen and clarify the obligations
in TRIPs via “TRIPs-plus” bilateral treaties. In these nego-
tiations, the United States uses its economic clout to com-
pel weaker developing countries to adopt intellectual
property rules that better protect the rights of IP property
holders, and that make it less likely that developing coun-
tries will invoke the exceptions allowed in parallel multi-
lateral agreements.
For example, TRIPs requires WTO members to protect
new plant varieties. But it allows them to do so “either by
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any
combination thereof.”22 Developing countries inter-
preted this provision as permitting them to tailor plant
variety protection laws to their domestic agricultural needs.
Yet the United States and the European Union have used
“TRIPs plus” treaties to restrict this discretion, pressuring
several of these countries to enact legislation that favors
the interests of foreign commercial plant breeders.23
The end result is greater cross-national variation how
international agreements are implemented. An analysis of
international rules alone may misleadingly suggest greater
uniformity than in fact exists. The salient politics emerge
only through country-by-country and issue-by-issue inter-
pretations by domestic actors.
Conclusion
The international intellectual property system is com-
prised of nested, overlapping, and parallel treaties and insti-
tutions that are populated by a shifting mosaic of issues,
states, and non-state actors. Scholars seeking to under-
stand the international and domestic politics of intellec-
tual property must consider the ways in which international
regime complexity shapes the strategies of state and non-
state actors as they vie for legal and policy dominance over
the rules that govern innovation and creativity policies.
Notes
1 Helfer 2007, 2004a, 2004b.
2 Drahos 2003.
3 Reichman 1995; Sell 2003.
4 Helfer 2004a.
5 Ibid.
6 Alter and Meunier 2009.
7 Drahos 2002.
8 Helfer 2004a, 2004b.
9 GRAIN 2005.
10 Keohane and Nye 2001.
11 Helfer 2004a.
12 Helfer 2004c; Saffrin 2002.
13 Drahos 2003.
14 Helfer 2004a.
15 Raustiala and Victor 2004.
16 Helfer 2004a.
17 ’t Hoen 2002 at 38 n.38.
18 Public Health Declaration 2001, ¶ 4.
19 Abbott 2005.
20 GRAIN 2000.
21 Helfer 2004a.
22 TRIPs, Article 27.3.b.
23 GRAIN 2004
References
Abbott, Frederick M. 2005. The WTO Medicines Deci-
sion: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection
of Public Health. American Journal of International
Law 99: 317–58.
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs). 1994. Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round
Vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197.
Alter, Karen J., and Sophie Meunier. 2009. The politics
of international regime complexity. Perspectives on
Politics 7 (1): 13–24.
Dinwoodie, Graeme B. 2002. The Architecture of the
International Intellectual Property System. Chicago-
Kent Law Review 77: 993–1014.
Drahos, Peter. 2003. When the Weak Bargain with the
Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organiza-
tion. International Negotiation 8 (1): 79–109.
_. 2002. Developing Countries and International
Intellectual Property Standard-Setting. Journal of
World Intellectual Property 5: 765–89.
GRAIN. 2005. Bilateral Agreements Imposing TRIPs-Plus
Intellectual Property Rights on Biodiversity in Develop-
ing Countries. www.grain.org.
_. 2004. Plant Variety Protection (PVP). www.grain.
org.
_. 2000. Andean Community Adopts New IPR Law.
www.grain.org.
Helfer, Laurence R. 2004a. Regime Shifting: The TRIPs
Agreement and the New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Making. Yale Journal of Inter-
national Law 29: 1–83.
| |



March 2009 | Vol. 7/No. 1 43
_. 2004b. Mediating Interactions in an Expanding
Intellectual Property Regime, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law 36:123–136.
_. 2004c. Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Vari-
eties: International Legal Regimes and Policy Options for
National Governments. Rome: FAO.
_. 2007. Toward a Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property. University of California Davis
University Law Review 40: 971–1020.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2001. The
Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Prob-
lems of Democratic Legitimacy. In Efficiency, Equity,
and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the
Millennium, ed. Roger B. Porter et al. Washington
DC: Brookings.
Raustiala, Kal, and David Victor. 2004. The Regime
Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. International
Organization 58 (2): 277–309.
Reichman, J.H. 1995. Universal Minimum Standards of
Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPs
Component of the WTO Agreement. International
Lawyer 29: 345–88.
_. 1997. Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of
the TRIPs Agreement, Virginia Journal of Inter-
national Law 37: 335–56.
Saffrin, Sabrina. 2002. Treaties in Collision? The Bio-
safety Protocol and the World Trade Organization
Agreements. American Journal of International Law
96: 606–28.
Sell, Susan K. 2003. Private Power, Public Law: The
Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Steinberg, Richard H. 1997. Trade-Environment Nego-
tiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional
Trajectories of Rule Development. American Journal
of International Law 91: 231–67.
’t Hoen, Ellen. 2002. TRIPs, Pharmaceutical Patents,
and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from
Seattle to Doha. Chicago Journal of International Law
3: 27–46.
WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess. Nov. 14,
2001. Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public
Health, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2.
| |



Symposium | International Regime Complexity
44 Perspectives on Politics
